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While reading literary works, what do readers experience? Do they experience 
only the words they listen to or read? How can we describe the experience of 
reading literary works? Do phantasy and imagination play any role during such 
experiences? These kinds of questions usually give rise to a twofold kind of 
research: on the one hand, a philosophical effort of combing through literature 
itself as a philosophical object of study, and — on the other hand — an attempt 
to argue for a cognitive portrait of those processes triggered by reading or 
listening to words (cf. Dehaene, 2007). Nevertheless, if we put aside these two 
sets of studies, which are plenty widespread and partly related to scientific 
branches, three new and interwoven ways of broaching the issue of literary 
experience come to light: 1) readers’ experiences of literary worlds; 2) readers’ 
visual involvement in literary experiences; 3) phantasy’s and imagination’s 
involvement in such experiences. These issues are strongly interwoven since 
each of them deals with the experience of reading literary works from slightly 
different perspectives: the first concerns the objects of literary experiences, the 
second focuses on a specific component of literary experiences, while the third 
aims at comprehending what role is up to phantasy and imagination during such 
experiences. The following research purports to answer the aforementioned 
questions and, in so doing, it develops and argues for the following thesis, which 
is the heart of the matter: reading literary works means experiencing literary 
worlds and, consequently, describing literary experiences means describing the 
literary worlds we experience while reading literary works. In order to achieve 
this goal, the experience of reading literary works acts as a jumping-off point 
useful for grasping literary worlds’ nature and the role imagination and phantasy 
play in literary experiences. The most striking outcome this study will attain 
concerns literary worlds’ actual bearing on the so-called real world: they greatly 
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affect our actions, beliefs and judgements much more than literature deemed 
as a mere description of reality or as a faraway fictional world may suggest.  
The current research consists of five steps, coinciding with five paragraphs 
and serving five purposes, as the following overview clears up: 
1) Literary experience consists in building literary worlds up. Such worlds 
are represented by literary works and are to be regarded as verbal images. The 
notion of “visual sketches” singles out a clear distinction between literary 
experiences and visual literary experiences. 
2) By virtue of imagination readers unfold literary worlds; by virtue of 
phantasy readers reflect upon literary worlds and carry out the cognitive value 
typical of literature: the distinction between imagination and phantasy is a 
fundamental step in order to clearly understand the abilities literary experience 
appeals to. 
3) The third section aims at taking stock of the link between the experience 
of reading literary works and the alleged knowledge we can acquire from them: 
despite the common and blurred agreement on the matter, can we argue for a 
thesis that clearly proves the possibility of deriving knowledge from literature? 
Thanks to phantasy readers can acquire knowledge from literary works.  
4) Do appropriate literary experiences exist? This fourth section’s purpose 
consists in identifying the standard of aesthetic appropriateness related to 
reading literary works. Phenomenology turns out to be useful for this 
identification and so its link with literature comes to light and gives rise to the 
possibility of a phenomenology of literature. 
5) The goals so far achieved will enable us to identify a clear nexus between 
literary worlds and real world. This last step is the key to get to the heart of the 
matter and distinguish literary reality from literary existence: literary worlds are per 
se real and potentially existing. 
 
1. Literary Experiences as (Visual) Experiences of Literary Worlds 
If asked to describe our ordinary experiences of reading literary works, we 
would avail ourselves of these or analogous words: when reading literary works, 
we participate into characters’ lives, we explore historical and geographical 
contexts different from the one we are sunk into, we feel emotions, we are 
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affected by what we read, we discover stories, and so forth. Otherwise, we could 
simply say that while reading literary works we experience literary worlds: thanks 
to I Promessi Sposi, Alessandro Manzoni allows us to experience the world of 
Renzo e Lucia, thanks to Pride and Prejudice, Jane Austen allows us to experience 
the world of Elizabeth and Darcy, thanks to Die Ungeduld des Herzens, Stefan 
Zweig allows us to experience the world of Edith and Hofmiller. It seems we 
could describe our common literary experiences by asserting that every literary 
work represents and unfolds a literary world we can discover by reading the text 
itself. Given that this description seems suitable and relevant to our common 
literary experiences, the point is: how can we describe these worlds? 
Furthermore, what are they? Which traits define their nature? Trying to answer 
these questions is the first step useful for understanding the core of literary 
experience itself. So, this first section aims at achieving three goals: 1) explaining 
literary experiences in terms of experiencing literary worlds; 2) comprehending 
literary worlds’ structure and nature; 3) bringing to light readers’ visual 
involvement in literary experiences. 
 
1.1. Literary World as Umwelt, Coordinates System and Welt 
First of all, literary theorist Thomas Pavel (2006: 56) suggests an interesting 
meaning of the term “world” related to literary scope: world as Umwelt, that is 
to say, as an environment and habitat conceivable only by human beings since 
it is the only world’s type humans can inhabit: 
Les mondes de la fiction, pour étranges, fantastiques ou bourrés de mythologie qu’ils 
soient, demeurent toujours pleinement humains. Il n’en saurait être autrement, et 
lorsqu’on parle de littérature et d’art, le terme de “monde”, comme l’allemand Umwelt, 
désigne un milieu, un habitat humains. C’est la seule famille de mondes au sein de 
laquelle nous sommes susceptibles d’être accueillis, et par conséquent la seule à laquelle 
nous pouvons nous abandonner. (Pavel, 2006: 56) 
It does not matter how literary worlds may seem to readers (strange, 
fictional, far apart from reality, absurd, etc.), Pavel draws our attention to their 
hallmark: they necessarily have to mirror a human habitat since they 
unavoidably arise from a human perspective. Provided that there are many 
different kinds of literary works, we can generally make the following 
distinction: some literary works refer to environments that are very akin to the 
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world we live in, whereas others refer to environments that are very different 
from the world we live in (cf. Walton, 1978a). Surely, many other possibilities 
range between these two extremes. We can think over this gradation, but what 
matters most is how strong is our belief that some literary worlds are more 
similar to our own world than others. And here Pavel’s stance turns out to be 
worthwhile (Pavel, 2006): however far literary worlds might seem, they are 
human worlds by necessity; however authors’ perspectives might be dissimilar, 
literary worlds arise from a human perspective by necessity. Therefore, literary 
worlds can be considered as instances of Umwelt since they arise from a human 
perspective by necessity and refer to a human habitat by necessity.  
Nonetheless, this first meaning does not seem a sufficient feature to 
account for a thorough description of literary worlds’ nature. Beyond this first 
meaning, a second and remarkable one can be ascribed to the expression 
“literary world”. Let us consider Silas Marner’s beginning (by George Eliot):  
in the days when the spinning-wheels hummed busily in the farmhouses – and even 
great ladies, clothed in silk and thread-lace, had their toy spinning-wheels of polished 
oak – there might be seen, in districts far away among the lanes, or deep in the bosom 
of the hills, certain pallid undersized men, who, by the side of the brawny country-
folk, looked like the remnants of a disinherited race.  
At first glance, this quote is a simple opening description and the author 
avails himself of it in order for readers to be introduced to the novel’s 
atmosphere. On closer inspection, however, the author seems to start providing 
readers with stable coordinates as means by which they can build a world up: 
spinning-wheels that hum, farmhouses, great ladies, lanes, toy spinning-wheels, 
polished oak, hills, pallid and undersized men, brawny country-folk, remnants 
of a disinherited race. These elements are like coordinates that enable readers 
to start building a literary world up: coordinates are like landmarks readers rely 
on in order to proceed with the reading and, at the end of the text, think of the 
literary work at issue as a whole, that is to say, as a literary world. Coordinates 
allow readers to comprehend every “piece” of the literary world at issue. For 
instance, let us consider I Promessi Sposi, by Alessandro Manzoni. The 
coordinates are simply those landmarks the novel relies on: there is a couple 
who aims at getting married, there are persons willing to help them and persons 
willing to prevent them from getting married, the historical frame is the XVII 
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century, there are religious characters that exemplify different portraits of the 
meaning of religion itself, and so on. All these elements are coordinates readers 
lean on to comprehend the novel as a whole, to comprehend it step by step. 
Thanks to coordinates, readers build up the literary world of I Promessi Sposi: the 
world where there is a couple who aims at getting married, where there are 
persons willing to help them, and so on. Similarly, while reading Silas Marner’s 
beginning, we identify a few coordinates (farmhouses, great ladies, lanes, toy 
spinning-wheels…) that enable us to gradually build up the world of Silas 
Marner.  
So, literary worlds are forced to mirror a human perspective — according 
to world’s first meaning — and are like coordinate systems — according to 
world’s second meaning. Thanks to coordinates authors provide readership 
with, readers are able to give rise to literary worlds, which are to be described 
as sorts of coordinate systems. Naturally, coordinates are inherently 
intersubjective, otherwise every reader’s literary experience would be related to 
a different world. Although readers’ experiences are very different from one 
another, coordinates refer to passages that every reader could pinpoint in the 
text. Perhaps the coordinates identified by me are not the same another reader 
identifies, but the point is that every coordinate roots in the text itself. 
Coordinates do not refer to readers’ own experiences, for example the emotions 
they personally feel during reading. Coordinates have to be shareable and 
characterized by accessibility: they are like a common thread that every reader 
of the same literary work shares. Hence, every literary world readers experience 
can be faithfully described as Umwelt and as a coordinate system.  
With regard to literary world as Umwelt, it is worth bearing in mind 
Ricoeur’s standpoint since he describes the dynamic that occurs between Welt 
and Umwelt right in literary scope. In order to understand his words accurately, 
it is necessary to put aside the meaning we have previously ascribed to the term 
Umwelt following Pavel’s thesis. Now, Ricoeur’s stance is useful for drawing a 
comparison between his own proposal and Pavel’s. So, Ricoeur writes: 
Tel est pour moi le référent de toute littérature: non plus l’Umwelt des références 
ostensives du dialogue, mais le Welt projeté par les références non ostensives de tous 
les textes que nous avons lus, compris et aimés». (Ricoeur, 1986: 189) 
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According to Ricoeur, Umwelt refers to a common context designated by 
an oral discourse, while Welt refers to a non-ostensive referential world 
designated by a written discourse: «loin de dire que le texte est sans monde, je 
soutiendrai sans paradoxe que seul l’homme a un monde et non pas seulement 
une situation» (Ricoeur, 1986: 188). Briefly, Ricoeur highlights that written 
discourses allow us to free text from context so that text’s reference is open, i.e. 
non-ostensive. At first glance, it could seem that Ricoeur’s thesis (i) diverges 
from Pavel’s (ii). Actually, these two theses are more alike than it could appear. 
According to (i), literary works refer to Welt since their references are open; 
according to (ii), literary works refer to Umwelt since they represent the only 
world’s type humans can inhabit. These two theses seem to be completely 
compatible since they regard two different levels: Ricoeur’s stance concerns 
literary works’ reference as Welt, while Pavel’s stance concerns literary works’ 
nature as Umwelt. This means that these two different theses can be regarded as 
equally valuable means useful for describing literary worlds’ nature. 
So, a triple meaning is related to the expression “literary world”: literary 
world as Umwelt, coordinate system and Welt — according to the strict meaning 
proposed by Ricoeur. This multilayer nature of literary world seems to be a first 
remarkable means useful for describing literary experiences: literary experiences 
are experiences of literary worlds and these worlds are marked by a triple 
meaning.  
 
1.2. Literary Experiences and Visual Literary Experiences: Literary Worlds as Verbal 
Images 
Now, it seems that, if we intend to carry out a faithful description of the 
experience of reading literary works, the theoretical outcomes just mentioned 
are not enough: i) literary experiences consist in experiencing literary worlds 
and ii) every literary world we experience is an instance of Umwelt, coordinates 
system and Welt. Our literary experiences are inherently distinguished by 
another feature that demands to be highlighted and examined accordingly, i.e. 
our literary visual involvement. Sometimes it happens that, while reading, we 
spontaneously outline visual sketches, which seem to be more like blurred and 
vague outlines than clear and sharply defined images. It is even possible that 
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readers become aware of their visual involvement and corresponding sketches 
only once they have finished reading, that is, when sketches that were outlined 
during reading flow together and blend into the representation of a literary 
world. Nevertheless, it also possible that readers become aware of these visual 
sketches piecemeal and then gather them together at once.  
This issue does not absolutely imply that every reader appeals to the words 
she reads as mainsprings useful for depicting mental images. Contrarily, the 
attempt to comb through and account for our visual involvement triggered by 
literary experiences is due to an extraordinariness that should pique our interest: 
words — read or just listened to — can act as mainsprings that lead us to outline 
visual sketches and then associate those sets of words with these sketches. 
Surely this kind of visual experience is not solely confined to literary field: it can 
also occur, for example, while we listen to words uttered by a friend, while we 
read a newspaper, and so forth. Nonetheless, this ordinary experience becomes 
a hallmark typical of literary experience since — in literature — such a visual 
involvement is related to an entire and complete set of words, that is to say, to 
a literary work. This means that those blurred sketches evoked by words flow 
together and give rise to a literary world.  
It is worth noticing that, regardless of any possible visual involvement, 
reading literary works inherently entails disclosing literary worlds. As the 
previous paragraph has just pointed out, literary experience consists in building 
literary worlds up by means of the coordinates provided by the text. Given this 
first step, the next step draws our attention to the possibility of relating visual 
sketches to literary worlds. Hence, beyond the level of literary experience, there 
is the one of visual literary experience1: it can occur that, while reading literary 
                                                        
1 The basis both experiences share is the perceptual or auditory one: reading or listening to words is 
the primary step required to experience literary worlds. From now on, literary experience will be 
referred to as an experience based in reading words rather than listening to words. Nowadays, the 
former seems to be more recurring and habitual than the latter: if we want to read The Old Man and 
the Sea, we take the book rather then ask someone to read it aloud for us. For this reason, we will 
explicitly refer to reading words rather than listening to them. Despite the huge differences between 
these two ways of experiencing literary worlds, the central issue of this study is equally relevant to 
both ways: literary experience consists in building literary worlds up by means of the coordinates 




works, readers outline visual sketches. Thus, readers’ literary experience can 
turn into visual literary experience and such an amazing experience demands to 
be better examined and comprehended.  
Now, let us focus on our reading experiences and think about texts that 
we usually regard as literary works: for example, a novel, a poem, or a tale. It 
often happens that, while reading these texts, we mentally sketch visual images 
arisen from words and phrases we have just read and we gradually end up 
imagining an entire literary world. Let us take into account the beginning of To 
the Lighthouse (by Virginia Woolf): 
“Yes, of course, if it’s fine tomorrow,” said Mrs Ramsay. “But you’ll have to be up 
with the lark,” she added. To her son these words conveyed an extraordinary joy, as if 
it were settled, the expedition were bound to take place, and the wonder to which he 
had looked forward, for years and years it seemed, was, after a night’s darkness and a 
day’s sail, within touch. Since he belonged, even at the age of six, to that great clan 
which cannot keep this feeling separate from that, but must let future prospects, with 
their joys and sorrows, cloud what is actually at hand, since to such people even in 
earliest childhood any turn in the wheel of sensation has the power to crystallise and 
transfix the moment upon which its gloom or radiance rests, James Ramsay, sitting on 
the floor cutting out pictures from the illustrated catalogue of the Army and Navy 
stores, endowed the picture of a refrigerator, as his mother spoke, with heavenly bliss. 
It was fringed with joy. The wheelbarrow, the lawnmower, the sound of poplar trees, 
leaves whitening before rain, rooks cawing, brooms knocking, dresses rustling — all 
these were so coloured and distinguished in his mind that he had already his private 
code, his secret language, though he appeared the image of stark and uncompromising 
severity, with his high forehead and his fierce blue eyes, impeccably candid and pure, 
frowning slightly at the sight of human frailty, so that his mother, watching him guide 
his scissors neatly round the refrigerator, imagined him all red and ermine on the Bench 
or directing a stern and momentous enterprise in some crisis of public affairs.  
While we read this passage, it can occur that visual and blurred sketches 
start taking shapes: readers can find themselves spontaneously outlining sketches 
related to James Ramsay’s joyful reaction, to his face, to his position in the 
room, to the sound of poplar trees and leaves whitening before rain he is 
fantasizing about, to the mother watching him, and so forth. Such a visual 
involvement is noteworthy: while we read literary works, it can happen that we, 
spontaneously, associate places, situations, events, characters’ faces or their 
acts, emotions and feelings with visual sketches, although we experience only 
words. It is worth stressing that such sketches are blurred and vague: readers 
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would not be able to describe them in detail. If they tried and so if they focused 
on them on purpose, then it would be a kind of visual experience different from 
the literary one, which is inherently spontaneous (cf. McGinn, 2004: 12-17). 
This literary visual engagement is a remarkable component of our ordinary 
literary experiences and it is worth combing it through: it demands to be better 
comprehended. In order to account for it, this research proposes to employ the 
expression “verbal image”: “verbal” since literary worlds’ root is verbal (they 
consist of words); “image” since readers outline visual sketches. The term 
“image” will be largely used from now on and so it is worth specifying its exact 
meaning, which at first blush seems more puzzling in comparison with 
“verbal”. 
First of all, the notion of verbal image has absolutely nothing to do with 
the widespread notion of mental image (Kosslyn 1994, 2005; Kosslyn - Denis, 
1999): readers outline visual sketches, they do not depict mental images. When 
we talk about mentally sketched images, the word “image” refers to a visual 
sketch rather than to a well-defined visual shape (Bianca, 2009: 159-167). This 
remark is very notable and makes clearer literary worlds’ nature as verbal 
images, i.e. as sets of visual sketches rooted into words. So, the thesis at stake 
does not entail that readers depict mental images starting from reading written 
words. They do not draw mental images, but they mentally outline visual sketches. 
Similarly, if the term “world” were misinterpreted and understood in 
accordance with its usual meaning, then the outcome would be something like 
this: while reading literary works, readers translate into mental images what they 
read and this procedure allows them to mentally portray everything in detail. 
Clearly, this inference is false and does not describe our literary experiences in 
a faithful way: let us consider an analogous instance that turns out to be very 
useful for showing this reasoning’s slip.  
A child sneaks under a table and, while playing, considers the table itself 
as a hut. So, this child acts as if the table were a hut and surely turns to 
imagination in order to play under the table as if it were a hut. Nonetheless, it 
seems that this child need not to draw a mental image of a hut in order to play 
under the table as if it were a hut. The child sees the table and behaves as if it 
were a hut: perhaps this behaviour implies some mental images of tables or 
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huts, but this hypothesis is not enough to believe that the kind of imagination 
arising while the child is playing is identical to the kind of imagination arising 
while she is drawing mental images on purpose. In fact, if the child at issue drew 
a mental image of a hut on purpose, then she would be able to describe its 
shape, colour, size and other physical features in detail. On the contrary, while 
playing, the child is focused on acting as if the table were a hut and not on 
visualizing the table as a hut: consequently, she does not concentrate on its 
shape, colour and size (Spinicci, 2009: 22-25). Similarly, while reading literary 
works, readers’ visual involvement does not imply that readers visualize every 
character described, every landscape, every situation, and so forth: this 
description would not portray faithfully our ordinary literary experiences. If one 
asked me to describe how I have visualized some characters of Silas Marner, 
then I would attempt to portray them on purpose and I would become able to 
describe them in detail, though I did not focus on their visualization while I was 
reading. Similarly, if the child were asked to visualize the table as a hut, then she 
would be able to describe its shape, colour and size in detail.  
These two instances of visualization are completely different: on the one 
hand, reading words triggers spontaneous shaping of visual sketches, on the other 
hand, one mentally shapes visual images — starting from words — on purpose. 
In the former case, we deal with images as mental and visual sketches; in the 
latter case, we deal with images as mental and visual sketches transformed into 
sharply defined pictures by focusing on them. Visual literary experiences arise 
from spontaneously shaping mental sketches readers are aware of: they did not 
willingly shape visual sketches, but they are aware of these sketches insofar as 
they find themselves outlining visual sketches starting from words. Visual literary 
experience refers to this spontaneous and possibly aware experience. 
Definitively and absolutely, it does not encompass cases in which readers shape 
mental images on purpose: this is not visual literary experience, whose main 
trait is spontaneity.  
In its entirety, every literary world seems to be visualized as a set of visual 
as well as spontaneous sketches, i.e. images that were outlined during reading. 
Readers identify coordinates and associate them with visual sketches and then 
such visual outlines — piecemeal or all at once — flow together and blend into 
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the representation of a literary world. Coordinates are means by which readers 
build up and, possibly, visualize literary worlds. The kind of visualization at 
issue is to be regarded as a visualization of an untidy set of visual sketches: at the 
end of I Promessi Sposi, readers retain visual sketches concerning some 
coordinates, that is to say, some scenes, passages, emotions, characters’ 
expressions, critical moments, and so on. They do not retain a portrait of the 
literary world at issue: they do not visualize it at as a picture. They associate it 
with blurred visual sketches. The outcome is an untidy set of visual sketches: 
Cardinal Federigo’s arrival, Lucia’s “Farewell to the mountains”, the encounter 
between Renzo and the two “bravi”, the dialogue between Renzo and Don 
Abbondio, Lucia’s fainting, etc. Once the novel is entirely read, all these visual 
sketches flow together in a blurred set and constitute a visualized literary world. 
A literary world is visualized if readers associate it with a series of visual sketches: 
they do not have to associate the literary world at issue with a sort of picture 
that gathers visual sketches together. And if readers do not spontaneously 
outline visual sketches, they build up the literary world of I Promessi Sposi 
anyway. 
Let us consider another example: are the readers of Kafka’s Die 
Verwandlung able to draw or to describe Gregor Samsa’s bedroom in detail? If 
they tried, they would achieve weak outcomes. Is this a proof that reading does 
not entail visualization? According to the proposed thesis, the answer would be 
dissenting. On the one hand, I am not definitively able to draw Gregor’s 
bedroom, but on the other hand, it is possible that I associated Kafka’s work, 
and so Gregor’s bedroom too, with a set of visual sketches. I cannot describe his 
bedroom in detail, but, for example, I could say that, while reading, I positioned 
the bed on the right side: I mentally visualized it. Paradoxically, I am not able 
to describe bed’s size, colour and shape, but I know that it is on the right side 
of the room. Moreover, I visualized his room’s door, because I mentally 
positioned it behind the bed, but I am not able to say anything else about it. 
When his sister enters the room, I did not visualize her as a person since I am 
not able to describe her physiognomy. Puzzlingly, I visualized her as a sort of 
human outline who entered the room and saw Gregor’s bed on her right. 
Paradoxically, I would not be able to say what she wears, how her hair and voice 
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look like, but I visualized her entering the room. There is a huge difference 
between this kind of visualization and the kind of visualization that enables 
readers to visualize every single detail they read about. In this last case, visual 
sketches take shape and then they turn into sharply defined pictures by readers’ 
focusing on them on purpose. While we read or listen to words, sometimes it 
occurs that we spontaneously associate words with images and we visualize blurred 
and vague sketches rather than well-defined pictures: this spontaneous 
association refers to an astonishing human ability we can become aware of and 
that characterises our visual literary experiences. 
 
1.3. Literary Representation and the Dynamic Between Visual Images and Verbal Images 
The notion of verbal image seems to describe only one side of the coin: it 
defines the spontaneous process though which readers associate words or set 
of words with visual sketches. The process through which authors employ 
words to disclose literary worlds is left out of account. This paragraph aims at 
examining this other side of the coin, authors’ one. 
Now, which is the element that relates literary works to literary worlds? 
Given that literary works are the sole means that enables us to discover literary 
worlds, which is the nexus between literary worlds and literary works? That is 
to say, how is it possible that literary works disclose literary worlds? If we focus 
on the means authors avail themselves of, i.e. words, it becomes possible to 
answer these questions. What do authors pursue through words? 
The use of words as I understand it — that is, words as a perpetual pursuit of things, 
as a perpetual adjustment to their infinity variety». (Calvino, 1988: 26) 
This quote illustrates the huge gap that ranges from words to “ideas”: 
every time we translate “ideas” into words, we always attain something different 
from what we had in mind. When authors start writing, they know what they 
are going to write about: let us referring to it with the general and overall term 
“ideas” and let us say that authors have “ideas” on the matter. The coincidence 
between ideas and the corresponding verbal and written translation seems 
unattainable. Let us try an experiment: think about something and then try to 
translate it into words. It happens that one ponders about every single word 
and attempts to find those words that best suit her own ides. Eventually, one 
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finds these words, writes them down and then re-reads them: the person at 
issue knows the mainspring these words ensued from and so she is able to 
evaluate whether these words are a suitable translation of the original ideas. So, 
she will be less or more satisfied with this brief text. But if someone else reads 
this text, then it surely gives rise to new ideas and, possibly, visual sketches 
different from those the author associated the words with. Translating “ideas” 
into words is inherently difficult since re-reading these words gives rise to new 
ideas and new visual sketches. So, this simple example shows an amazing 
human ability, that is, the one that enables us to shape visual sketches starting 
from reading or listening to words. Words act as mainspring of visual sketches 
and this dynamic applies to readers as well as to authors. Now, how can the 
process of translating ideas into words be called? Answering this question 
means singling out the element we are searching for, i.e. the element that ties 
literary works to literary worlds and vice versa.  
“Representation” seems to be the missing element: literary works represent 
literary worlds2. What does “to represent” mean? What does “representation” 
hint at? The Italian literary scholar Cesare De Marchi suggests a valuable and 
remarkable proposal on this matter: in literary scope, representing means 
translating a subjective experience into words (De Marchi, 2007: 16). 
Consequently — he maintains — writing means trying to grasp through words 
one’s own viewpoint towards world and this effort especially characterises 
literary scope: authors endeavour to find words that seem to them as suitable 
as possible to represent their viewpoint towards world. Writing consists in the 
effort of translating “ideas” into words, that is to say, in representing these “ideas”. 
Thanks to De Marchi’s proposal we can argue that literary works represent literary 
worlds: authors represent literary worlds and so representation is the element 
that ties literary works to literary worlds and vice versa. 
Once the author has found those words that seem suitable to represent what 
she has in mind, if one reads them, verbal images arise. These images will never 
exactly mirror author’s original ideas and will never coincide with those images 
that other readers would outline while reading. The basic and starting idea that 
                                                        
2 In literary scope, I would translate “to represent” and “representation” into the more eloquent 
German words “darstellen” and “Darstellung”. 
 76 
acts as a jumping-off point for the act of writing is translated into words by 
authors: the overall term “ideas” refers to text’s contents — chosen by authors 
— and visual contents that authors possibly visualize while writing (for example, 
while describing). Authors translate “ideas” into words and readers give rise to 
verbal images. So, a dichotomy between two items underlies the text of every 
literary work: authors’ ideas and readers’ images. Following Calvino’s 
terminology (1988: 83), the first one can be called «visual image»; following this 
research’s proposal, the second one can be called “verbal image”. The 
expression “visual image” does not absolutely refer to authors’ possible visual 
experiences: it regards the ideas that authors translate into words and these ideas 
embrace also authors’ possible visual sketches. Although it seems possible that 
authors do not appeal to visualization while writing, the expression “visual 
image” turns out to be useful since it also embraces authors’ possible visual 
experiences and since it can be put in relation with readers’ images, that is to 
say, verbal images. The dynamic at stake occurs between two different kinds of 
images: visual and verbal images. Authors translate visual images into words 
and every reader who reads them gives rise to verbal images. Consequently, 
verbal images become gradually independent of visual images since every reader 
gives rise to different verbal images starting from those words chosen by 
authors: text’s words act as midpoint between visual images and verbal images. 
Once we have taken stock of the dynamic between visual and verbal 
images, we can claim that literary works are first of all verbal entities that consist 
of a set of words: this set embraces those words authors regarded as suitable 
means to translate their own visual images, that is to say, to represent a literary 
world. Every single word is a necessary step in order for authors to represent a 
literary world and for readers to disclose it. Authors represent literary worlds 
through words: they translate visual images into words and this gradual 
translation consists in the act of writing. Is there a word able to summarize the 
entirety of this process related to writing? The term “unfold”3 seems suitable: 
to unfold means to “unroll” visual images through words. Accordingly, readers 
re-unfold what authors unfolded and in so doing verbal images arise. 
                                                        
3 I would translate “to unfold” into the more eloquent German verb “ausstellen”. 
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To sum up, literary works represent literary worlds that are understandable 
as verbal images. The notion of verbal image singles out a clear distinction 
between literary experiences and visual literary experiences: the former is related 
to literary worlds as instances of coordinates system, Umwelt and Welt; the latter 
is related to literary worlds as instances of coordinates system, Umwelt, Welt and 
verbal images. In order to avoid misunderstandings, some concluding remarks 
turn out to be relevant. Firstly, it is very important to emphasize that the word 
“images” refers to visual sketches, blurred and vague visual outlines. Secondly, 
it is worth underlining that the expression “visual images” does not entail that 
authors visualize what they write about: this expression mainly refers to text’s 
contents that authors chose to write about and, if authors visualize some visual 
sketches while writing, then this expression encompasses these cases too. 
Thirdly, the dichotomy between visual and verbal images enables us to 
recognize visualization’s role in literature without claiming that writing literary 
works consists in visualizing literary worlds and that reading literary works 
consists in translating literary worlds into mental images. 
 
1.4. Reading Without Visualizing: Verbal Image and its Overarching Meaning  
Let us pay attention to the thesis just discussed: the concept of verbal image 
concerns the whole of images readers devise while reading literary works. It is 
a matter of visual sketches rooted into words. At first glance, it seems that this 
thesis is partly incomplete since visualization does not start working reading 
every literary work. It seems that readers do not always outline visual and mental 
sketches. For this reason, the notion of verbal image would apply only to a 
certain extent since it would be useful for describing only visual literary 
experiences rather than literary experiences in general. Let us call to mind the 
well-known poem by Giuseppe Ungaretti (1919), Mattina (Morning): «M’illumino 
/d’immenso» (Clive Wilmer’s English translation: “I flood myself with the light 
of the immense”). We can generally say that a reader of this short poem does 
not associate it with a verbal image by necessity. Certainly, perhaps there are 
readers who associate it with some visual sketches, but it does not always occur 
and it is plausible and reasonable to believe that this poem gives rise to verbal 
images less frequently than a, for example, a passage from a novel. The concept 
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of verbal image is so fruitful and valuable that embraces cases of reading 
without visualizing and so it can be even related to those literary works that do 
not trigger readers’ visualization. This implies that Ungaretti’s poem should be 
regarded as an instance of verbal image, although verbal images do not probably 
arise by reading it. How could we stretch the meaning of the term “verbal 
image”? We are going to argue that the expression “verbal image” refers to a 
double meaning: firstly, it highlights that literary worlds can be regarded as a set 
of visual sketches that are verbal as they arise from words; secondly, the 
expression “verbal image” also encompasses those literary works that do not 
act as sources of visual sketches and so it can be appealed to as a valuable 
description of literary experiences in general, regardless of the possible visual 
involvement readers could experience.  
Now, we are arguing that those literary worlds that do not trigger readers’ 
visualization are to be described as instances of verbal images anyway: what 
does it mean? This simply means that for those readers who do not devise 
verbal images while reading, the literary work at issue still represents a literary 
world as a verbal image. Therefore, all literary works represent literary worlds 
that can be considered as verbal images. If readers’ visualization is triggered and 
so they spontaneously outline visual sketches, then we will have an instance of 
verbal image (according to verbal image’s first meaning). On the contrary, if 
readers’ visualization is not triggered and so spontaneous outlining of visual 
sketches is not at stake, then we will have an instance of verbal image anyway: 
in fact, the text itself would be considered as an image of emotions arisen from 
reading or themes exemplified by the text (according to verbal image’s second 
meaning). The distinction between these two meanings is not sharp, because it 
exclusively depends upon readers’ experiences. Nonetheless, both kinds of 
images — visual sketches and verbal images of emotions or themes — are 
inherently verbal since they arise from a linguistic substratum (a single sentence, 
a set of sentences or an entire literary work). So, literary works that do not 
trigger visualization are verbal images anyway: this occurs since they are images, 
rooted into words, of emotions arisen during reading and/or themes exemplified 
by the text. Let us consider an example.  
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While reading the aforementioned poem “Morning” we can be 
emotionally involved and, at the same time, spontaneously give rise to verbal 
images or, contrariwise, we can be just emotionally involved without giving rise 
to any verbal image. In the first case, readers would associate the poem with 
visual sketches; in the second case, readers would associate the poem with 
emotions only. For instance, the poem “Morning” could be associated with an 
emotion of calmness. This means that the poem becomes a representation (a 
translation into words) of the emotion of calmness: the poem is a verbal image 
of calmness. The words it consists of constitute a sort of verbal portrait of the 
emotion of calmness. For readers who associate “Morning” with calmness, this 
poem is a verbal image of calmness. Literary worlds could be verbal images of themes 
too: for example, Uno, nessuno e centomila by Pirandello could be regarded as a 
verbal image of the themes of alienation and isolation, Se questo è un uomo by Levi 
as a verbal image of the theme of sorrow and angst, Ficciones by Borges as a verbal 
image of lightness, and so forth. 
The broad meaning of the expression “verbal image” enables us to deem 
every literary world represented by literary works as an instance of verbal image. 
Emotions, themes and visual sketches related to literary worlds strictly depend 
upon readers and so they can be deeply different from one another (visual 
sketches could even not arise). Nevertheless, emotions, themes and visual 
sketches rely on a basis shared by every reader’s literary experience, that is to 
say, text’s coordinates and literary worlds themselves, i.e. the heart of (visual) 
literary experiences.  
 
1.5. Visual Experiences Aside from Literary Experiences 
The outcomes so far achieved with regard to visual literary experiences highlight 
a significant point: starting from verbal stimuli (words) readers outline visual 
sketches. While reading literary works, they possibly outline visual sketches and 
so end up building literary worlds up: they associate words with visual sketches 
and so verbal images arise. These images are rooted into words, but then they 
become independent of them: readers sketch verbal images starting from words, 
they do not sketch images with words. Readers’ visualization points out a 
dynamic between two elements: verbal stimuli and verbal images. Visual literary 
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experiences are just a token of a broader range of visual experiences springing 
from verbal stimuli. Equally, verbal stimulus is just a type whose tokens are 
newspapers, magazines, tales, conversations, and so forth. Every other set of 
words and phrases (both oral and written) is a token of verbal stimulus. So, 
thanks to the concept of verbal image it is possible to realize the 
extraordinariness of an astonishing human ability, that is, the ability to shape 
mental and visual images starting from verbal stimuli. Beyond verbal stimuli, 
other kinds of stimuli can act as mainsprings of visual sketches: in this sense, 
visual experiences surely exceed the verbal field typical of literary experiences 
and the verbal field in general.  
In this respect, the classification suggested by Paivio and Sadoski turns out 
to be remarkable and relevant (Paivio - Sadoski, 2004). They distinguish verbal 
stimuli from non-verbal ones. Starting from these two main classes, they sort 
all the other possible kinds of stimuli: the first set embraces sight (visual 
language [writing]), hearing (auditory language [speech]) and touch (Braille, 
handwriting), whereas the second one embraces sight (visual objects), hearing 
(environmental sounds), touch (“feel” of objects), taste (taste memories) and 
smell (smell memories). This kind of classification ensues from the following 
assumption: «all mental representations retain some of the concrete qualities of 
the external experiences from which they derive. These experiences can be 
linguistic or non linguistic» (Paivio - Sadoski, 2004: 3). Commenting on Kant’s 
stance about imagination, Hannah Arendt argued for an analogous thesis: 
according to her, imagination is a reproductive faculty that enables human beings 
to represent what is absent. By contrast, a productive faculty enables human 
beings to “produce” something totally new and this faculty concerns the artistic 
scope. Nevertheless, she underlines how this faculty cannot be completely 
productive: «it produces, for instance, the centaur out of the given: the horse 
and the man» (Arendt, 1992: 79). Similarly, Paivio and Sadoski highlight that 
visual sketches retain qualities of the stimuli they spring from: stimuli give rise 
to images that retain signs of stimuli themselves. Furthermore, they point out 
another notable issue: there are many different kinds of stimuli triggering 
visualization. The connection between visually shaped images and stimuli they 
spring from is at stake. In literary scope, such a connection occurs between 
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visual sketches and words, literary worlds and literary works, text’s coordinates 
and verbal images. 
So, visualization is not confined to literary experiences, which are just an 
instance of this human ability. The nexus between stimuli and visual images 
occurs in many other scopes: on the one hand, one devises images starting from 
stimuli, and on the other hand, these images are often appealed to in order to 
achieve many different goals. As the Italian philosopher Bianca clearly 
underlines, we appeal to these visual and mental images in order to fulfil 
different tasks: for example, recognize objects, solve practical problems, 
remember something or someone, plan and design future possible events 
(Bianca, 2009). Moreover, visualization can be triggered without a specific 
practical purpose: mental images can just spontaneously arise, without a specific 
reason and function (McGinn, 2004: 7-41). All these visual experiences, despite 
their deep differences, share a common feature: we associate verbal and non-
verbal stimuli with images, we store these images up and, possibly, we use them 
when we need them. Thus, visual literary experiences call for a broader scope 
of visual experiences: regardless of the specific kind at issue, every visual 
experience highlights a dynamic between visual sketches and their wellspring, 
and the former retains signs of the latter. In literary scope, the dynamic between 
visual sketches and words is at stake: readers carry it out as a dynamic between 
words and verbal images, whereas authors carry it out as a dynamic between 
words and visual images. The entire dynamic between visual and verbal images 
characterizes literary experience itself. 
 
2. What Role is up to Phantasy and Imagination in Literary Experiences? 
The first section has just enabled us to comprehend literary experience’s 
hallmark, literary worlds’ nature and readers’ visual involvement. From these 
outcomes the following question arises: is there a specific ability readers avail 
themselves of in order for them to unfold literary worlds? That is to say, how 
can they unfold literary worlds? Furthermore, is there a specific ability readers 
avail themselves of in order for them to reflect upon literary worlds? Another 
fundamental question follows from these doubts: is literature endowed with 
cognitive value? That is to say, are our reflections upon literary worlds endowed 
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with cognitive value? Do these reflections enable us to gain knowledge with 
regard to their contents?  
An account of literary experience should face these questions and try to 
answer them. It seems that each of these questions deals with the same issue: 
readers’ abilities on which literary experiences rest. In fact, once fully 
understood that literary experiences are (visual) experiences of literary worlds, 
it seems necessary to identify those abilities that enable us to disclose literary 
worlds and to reflect upon what they represent. These abilities would be in fact 
other elements that inherently constitute every literary experience, regardless of 
any possible visual involvement. And so, which are these abilities?   
It seems that two different faculties are at stake: the one that allows us to 
re-unfold literary worlds, and the one that allows us to reflect upon the re-
unfolded literary worlds. This research’s proposal is the following: imagination is 
the key to literary worlds, whereas phantasy is the key to every reflection focused 
on literary worlds. By virtue of imagination readers re-unfold literary worlds; by 
virtue of phantasy readers reflect upon literary worlds and carry out the cognitive 
value typical of literature. In the ordinary language imagination often overlaps 
phantasy and their distinction remains blurred and faint: literary experience calls 
for a clear distinction between them since it entails both of them in two 
remarkably different ways. 
Fantasizing and imagining are widespread and common experiences: these 
two phenomena play a prevailing role in our ordinary life and they often seem 
to overlap each other. We usually avail ourselves of imagination or phantasy in 
order to explain and describe phenomena like daydreaming (cf. Somer, 2002), 
escapism from reality, making believe, children’s games, hypothetical reasoning, 
visualization and several experiences somehow related to the aesthetic scope. 
Whatever ability enables us to have such experiences surely it leaves us 
spellbound: no matter how I could appear in the others’ eyes, now I could make 
believe that right here in front of me there is a dragon chasing me, that this 
room is a cave, that this desk is a boat helpful for escaping. Moreover, I am able 
to put reality into brackets and start fantasizing about an exotic place, a new job 
or an historic context different from the one I am sunk into. Similarly, I could 
take a paper, draw a few lines and then conceive those lines as a representation 
 83 
of a human face; and if one told me that she hardly manages to recognize it, 
then I would say: “Just imagine it by using the lines as a mere prompter”.  
We have taken into account just a few of the several experiences that we 
would commonly regard as experiences somehow involving phantasy or 
imagination. These experiences draw our attention to and highlight an amazing 
human ability: we can imagine the impossible, we can fantasize about the non-
existent, we can visualize what we imagine and fantasize about while carrying 
on living our life in the real world; we can give rise to worlds and scenarios that 
are totally incompatible with what actually happens or happened: in this scope, 
it seems that nothing is impossible to us. The constrains that force us in the real 
world seem to lose their binding power as well as scenarios of endless 
possibilities seem to become disclosed before us: «in contrast to animals, we 
can doubt reality and imagine things that do not exist — i.e. we can think and 
act in terms of “as if”. The irrealis mood in language — would, should, could 
— is the verbal expression of our ability to fantasize, fictionalize, and virtualize» 
(Fuchs, 2014: 153). What role is up to phantasy and imagination while we 
experience literary worlds? 
 
 
2.1. The Possibilities Imagination Yields: Imagination as Making Believe 
Readers unfold literary worlds: which ability do readers appeal to? It seems that 
readers’ process of unfolding literary worlds relies on imagination as making 
believe (cf. Pavel, 1986; Kind, 2001). Thanks to imagination readers make believe: 
they make believe that Elizabeth is in love with Darcy, they make believe that 
Gregor Samsa has lost his human physiognomy, and so forth. While reading, 
we imagine and, possibly, we visualize the worlds we imagine, those worlds we 
make believe that are world (cf. Voltolini, 2010; Walton, 1980, 1983): we make 
believe that the world of Elizabeth and Darcy really exists, that the world of 
Gregor Samsa really exists. This making believe does not imply that we believe 
that Darcy, Elizabeth and Gregor really exist in the real world as we ourselves 
exist. Literary making believe refers to the following “alief” (Gendler, 2010: 
238-255): we make believe that the literary world where Elizabeth and Darcy 
get married and the one where Gregor Samsa loses his human physiognomy 
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exist. This issue does not imply any ontological claim concerning literary worlds’ 
existence. The way of existence typical of Elizabeth’s and Gregor’s world is 
representation: literary worlds exist insofar as they are represented. Literary works 
represent literary worlds and, in so doing, literary works give rise to literary 
worlds that readers unfold: the ability that enables readers to unfold literary 
worlds is imagination. While reading, we imagine4, that is to say, we lean on text’s 
coordinates and, slowly and gradually, we end up imagining an entire world.  
Now, let us focus on this particular instance of imagination, i.e. making 
believe: it seems that when making believe we appeal to imagination as the 
ability that allows us to yield possibilities that are more constrained rather than 
unconstrained (cf. Kind, 2016; Kind, 2011). While making believe, for example, 
that right here in front of me there is a dragon chasing me, I am by necessity 
hedged in by some physical constraints I cannot elude: first of all, the physical 
space I am in. If I made believe to flee from the dragon, I could not make 
believe that walls and objects like chairs or desks do not exist: they would be 
obstacles I need to dodge. Contrariwise, if I just daydreamed about a dragon 
chasing me, then in this fantasized world I would not face with constraints that 
hedge me in: I could daydream to flee from the dragon thanks to my power to 
pass through walls and any other physical obstacle. Nonetheless, at the same 
time, we should acknowledge that imagination enables us to yield unconstrained 
possibilities: when making believe that I did not get a bad mark — although I 
actually got it — I am giving rise to a possibility that loosens reality’s constraints 
and so we could describe this possibility as an unconstrained one. However, the 
constraints that tether this possibility to reality are prevailing: the bad mark I got 
cannot be eluded, this reality’s constraint cannot de loosened. So, it seems that 
the possibilities imagination, as making believe, yields are more constrained 
than unconstrained: imagination enables us to slacken reality’s constraints 
rather than eluding them (cf. Saraiva, 1970: 53).  
While reading literary works, we imagine the corresponding literary 
worlds: which are the constraints imagination faces with? Which constraints 
rule over our making believe? These constraints coincide with the coordinates 
authors provide readership with: readers’ making believe that Elizabeth and 
                                                        
4 I would translate “to imagine” into the more eloquent German verb “sich vorstellen”. 
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Darcy get married slacken reality’s constraints insofar as readers unfold a literary 
world. Nonetheless, these possibilities are strictly hedged in by precise 
constraints that guide our reading, and so our unfolding, and so our making 
believe. 
When dealing with making believe as an instance of imagination, we 
should also encompass hypothetical reasoning — i.e. factual and counterfactual 
reasoning — and the kind of imagination appealed to during children’s games 
(cf. Plessner, 1982): both these cases seem to share imagination’s feature of 
yielding possibilities that are more constrained than unconstrained. 
Hypothetical reasoning consists in imagining possible scenarios, imagining what 
could happen in the future and what could have happened in the past (cf. Sacks 
2010). This kind of imagination seems to be endowed with an epistemic value. 
The expression “epistemic value” is used in accordance with the meaning 
proposed by philosopher Amy Kind: what is endowed with epistemic value can 
justify our beliefs in a contingent claim about the world: «there are a variety of 
situations — real situations — in which it is plausible to claim that the 
justification for a non-modal belief owes to an act of the imagination — that is, 
in which an imagining can justify our belief in a contingent claim about the 
world» (Kind, 2013: 2). For example, if I carried out an hypothetical reasoning 
in order for me to make a decision — decide whether to spend holidays in the 
mountains or at the sea — then this imagining could justify my future decision: 
to this extent, imagination as hypothetical reasoning is endowed with epistemic 
value. On the other side, the kind of imagination entailed by making believe — 
i.e. during literary experiences — and by children’s games seems to be endowed 
with heuristic value: it enables us to disclose new dimensions of reality. The term 
“heuristic” is used following Ricoeur’s proposal: «force heuristique, c’est-à-dire 
leur capacité d’ouvrir et de déployer de nouvelles dimensions de réalité» 
(Ricoeur, 1986: 221). So, the kind of imagination entailed by children’s games 
and by making believe is endowed with heuristic value, whereas the kind of 
imagination entailed by instances of hypothetical reasoning is endowed with 
epistemic value. Literary experiences call for imagination as making believe and 
this token of imagination mutually includes cases of children’s games and 
hypothetical reasoning. 
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2.2. The Possibilities Phantasy Yields: Phantasy as Freie Phantasie 
Moving on to phantasy, we can now lean on two Husserlian issues that turn out 
to be helpful in comprehending its role in literary experiences. In Phänomenologie 
und Erkenntnistheorie (Husserl, 1987) — one of the two essays focused on his 
Inaugural Lecture held at University of Freiburg — Husserl distinguishes 
träumende Phantasie, we avail ourselves of when daydreaming, from freie Phantasie, 
we avail ourselves of when appealing to eidetic variation5 (cf. Husserl, 1901: 
454-458; Husserl, 1980).  
When I fantasize about a centaur, I experience a quasi-perception of this 
centaur. While I am experiencing this, I do not mingle the world of centaurs 
with the actual world I now inhabit. I do not make believe that the centaur leaps 
into the road I am now crossing. So, what am I doing while fantasizing about a 
centaur? To this purpose Husserl distinguishes “freie Phantasie” from 
“träumende Phantasie” (or “reine Phantasie”). How do they differ? According 
to Husserl, I rely on freie Phantasie when I appeal to eidetic variation, while I rely 
on träumende Phantasie when I daydream about something. Daydreaming implies 
that the sphere of reality and the sphere of phantasy definitively overlap. I am 
not confined to quasi-perceive the centaur: träumende Phantasie makes me quasi-
experience the fantasized events, I quasi-judge them and I take position on 
them through pleasure or displeasure. So, the kind of phantasy we often refer 
to is, in Husserlian terms, träumende Phantasie.  
Freie Phantasie makes eidetic variation possible: when appealing to eidetic 
variation, we are not lost in distant phantasy scenarios, indeed we are 
tremendously absorbed in the world we inhabit and we try to grasp the essence 
of what concerns us by varying it. In his research, geometer appeals to freie 
Phantasie: «in der Phantasie muß er sich freilich um klare Anschauungen 
bemühen, dessen ihn die Zeichnung und das Modell enthebt. Aber in 
wirklichem Zeichnen und Modellieren ist er gebunden, in der Phantasie hat er 
die unvergleichliche Freiheit in der willkürlichen Umgestaltung der fingierten 
Figuren» (Husserl, 1913: 131). So, when Husserl talks about Phantasie in relation 
                                                        
5 Phenomenologically, the expression “eidetic variation” refers to a method we can follow in order 
to identify the traits that constitute the essence of the phenomenon we are investigating. This method 
consists in mentally varying the phenomenon at issue in its essential traits (Husserl, 1913: §4, §70). 
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with eidetic variation, he is referring to freie Phantasie. This correlation is broadly 
misunderstood and overshadowed by Italian translations that often make 
readership mistake phantasy for imagination.  
By appeal to träumende Phantasie, we can ride centaurs; by appeal to freie 
Phantasie, we fantasize about centaurs in order to understand what they are, just 
as geometers avail themselves of phantasy in their investigative thinking 
(Husserl, 1913: §7). The dichotomy between freie and träumende Phantasie roots 
in a common feature: as Husserl says, phantasy yields (ergibt) possibilities 
(Husserl, 1987). Following Husserl, freie and träumende Phantasie yield 
possibilities. Now, if we focus on this phantasy’s hallmark, we could describe 
the possibilities phantasy yields as constrained and unconstrained possibilities: 
Phantasie yields possibilities devoid of constraints (we flee reality) and governed 
by constraints (we cannot completely put reality into brackets since reality itself 
overlaps fantasized objects). For example, when fantasizing about centaurs, we 
do not care about centaurs’ actual nonexistence since we “put into brackets” 
real world along with its constraints: we are no longer hedged in by reality’s 
constraints. Nonetheless, we are constrained by the fantasized object’s identity: 
we are hedged in by the traits that constitute the identity of the centaur. The 
essential traits that define centaurs act as boundaries of fantasizing: if, while 
fantasizing about centaurs, I exceeded such boundaries, then I am no longer 
fantasizing about centaurs. 
 Moreover, if we focus on our experiences of fantasizing, we could draw 
a further conclusion: freie Phantasie is endowed with cognitive value, whereas 
träumende Phantasie is endowed with heuristic rather than cognitive value. The 
former enables us to gain knowledge about reality, whereas the latter enables us 
to disclose new dimensions of reality. This simply means that the appeal to freie 
Phantasie enables us to gain knowledge whereas the appeal to träumende Phantasie 
enables us to freely disclose new dimensions of reality, regardless of the 
knowledge we would gain from this disclosure. The term “heuristic” is used 
following Ricoeur’s proposal: «force heuristique, c’est-à-dire leur capacité 
d’ouvrir et de déployer de nouvelles dimensions de réalité» (Ricoeur, 1986: 221). 
So, what role is up to phantasy in literary experiences? Literary experiences 
call for phantasy as träumende and freie Phantasie. The former enables us to regard 
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literary worlds as springboards for fantasizing (for example, daydreaming); the 
latter enables us to reflect upon the literary worlds just unfolded. This last case 
is what matters most: thanks to phantasy readers reflect upon the phenomena 
literary works exemplify and, by means of eidetic variation, they reflect upon 
the nature of these phenomena. This means that readers’ appeal to free 
phantasy brings about literature’ cognitive value: thanks to free phantasy we can 
reflect upon literary worlds and, consequently, acquire knowledge from them. 
How exactly does this link between free phantasy and literature’s cognitive 
value take shape during our literary experiences? 
 
3. Free Phantasy and Literature’s Cognitive Value: How Literature Gives Rise to 
Knowledge  
The previous section has just allowed us to comprehend the role phantasy and 
imagination play in literary experiences and identify those abilities through 
which readers disclose literary worlds and reflect upon them. We are now in a 
better position for answering the previous questions: is there a specific ability 
readers avail themselves of in order for them to unfold literary worlds? Is there 
a specific ability readers avail themselves of in order for them to reflect upon 
literary worlds? The first faculty is imagination as making believe, the second 
one is phantasy as free variation. 
This third section aims at examining the link between our usual experience 
of reading literary works — that is to say, unfolding literary worlds — and the 
alleged knowledge we can acquire from them (i.e. the link between free phantasy 
and literature’s cognitive value). In so doing, phantasy’s role in our literary 
experiences will clearly come to light. Two puzzlements act as wellspring: 
despite the common and blurred agreement on the matter, can we argue for a 
thesis that clearly proves the possibility of deriving knowledge from literature? 
If so, can we account for the kind of knowledge at stake? The current section 
purports to answer these questions neatly and affirmatively.  
 
3.1. Does Literature’s Cognitive Value Depend upon Distance? 
When the topic of literature’s cognitive value is at stake, the basic puzzle we 
have to deal with seems to be the following: if literary works turn to fictional 
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worlds, then we acquire knowledge concerning these fictional worlds; if literary 
works turn to non-fictional worlds, then we acquire knowledge concerning the 
world we live in6. Taken to the extreme, this paradox sounds like this: according 
to the first standpoint, when reading Borges’ texts, we acquire knowledge that 
refer only to Borges’ fictional worlds and not to our world; according to the 
second standpoint, when reading Tolstoj’s words describing — in War and Peace 
— the struggle between Napoleon and Kutuzov, we acquire knowledge that 
refers also to our world, where the struggle between Napoleon and Kutuzov 
actually took place.  
Putting the matter in this way, we would examine the issue concerning the 
cognitive value of literature by means of scanning the fictional vs non-fictional 
divide. This entails that the final thesis we could attain would concern a 
contigent level of knowledge since the knowledge we achieve from literature 
would depend upon the degree of distance that detaches fictional worlds from 
real world: if fictional worlds are thoroughly set apart from reality, then readers 
learn something about real world in a small extent; contrariwise, if fictional 
worlds are closer to reality, then readers learn something about real world in a 
larger extent. According to this approach, the knowledge readers can acquire 
from literature is related to a contingent level since it counts only contingently. 
For example, while reading Moby Dick, readers unavoidably acquire knowledge 
regarding whalers in the XIX century, as well as while reading Anna Karenina, 
readers — by means of a reasoning of generalization — acquire knowledge of 
the fact that what happened to Anna could hypothetically happen to everyone 
(Pavel, 1986: ch. VI). This kind of knowledge can be deemed as a contingent 
knowledge since it counts contingently and not universally: the beliefs related 
to this knowledge could be, potentially, falsified7. The whalers described by 
Melville are different from those of nowadays. Likewise, what happened to 
                                                        
6 The expression “fictional world” is used in accordance with Pavel’s meaning (1986). More generally, 
we can say that fictional worlds point out a specific type of literary worlds: literary worlds can be 
fictional or non-fictional. As long as this divide depends upon literary worlds’ distance from real 
world, this divide is not sharp and does not seem to be a distinction useful for this research’s purposes 
and goals. 
7 This contingent level of knowledge is strongly tethered to the epistemic value typical of the two 
aforementioned instances of imagination, i.e. hypothetical reasoning and the kind of imagination 
appealed to during children’s games. 
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Anna Karenina seems to be partly unlikely in XXI century since social and 
cultural contexts are deeply different from hers.  
If we accepted this thesis, we would be accordingly forced to admit two 
further claims and not to deal with a third topic that seems to deserve more 
attention indeed: 1) the cognitive value of literature depends upon the kind of 
literary work we are reading (more or less fictional); 2) the cognitive value of 
literature is only contingent; 3) the question whether the cognitive value of 
literature is intertwined with readers’ role remains with no answer. Next 
paragraphs argue against the first claim, show the incompleteness of the second 
one and argue for readers’ pivotal role in grasping literature’s cognitive value. 
Thomas Pavel’s stance could be regarded as a remarkable sample of the 
approach that takes for granted the first two claims and neglects the third one. 
His standpoint is useful for realizing that the knowledge we acquire from 
literature is not confined to a contingent scope, but also embraces a non-
contingent one: thanks to phantasy as free variation we can reach a level of 
knowledge that exceeds the contingent sphere. Nonetheless, Pavel’s argument 
accounts only for the first sort of knowledge and hence it is criticized 
accordingly. In his masterpiece Fictional Worlds (1986), he avails himself of 
Kendall Walton’s and Gareth Evans’ accounts of literary worlds’ nature in order 
to argue for two principles that master and forge the relations between fictional 
worlds and real world: the principle of distance and the principle of relevance. 
It is not a matter of a sharp distinction, but this proposal relies on a strong 
conviction: according to Pavel, fiction primarily aims at creating a distance and, 
only if it aims at making fictional worlds relevant to the real world, then it 
attempts to shorten this distance. So, if authors comply with these two 
principles, then the resulting fictional worlds will be apart from reality (principle 
of distance) as well as influential (principle of relevance). Contrary to Pavel, it 
seems that literary worlds can affect readers even outside these two principles 
since — as Calvino pointed out (1988) — it is not possible for humans to adopt 
a non-human perspective. This means that, no matter how fictional worlds may 
seem far apart from reality, they cannot avoid the human perspective itself and 
so they cannot avoid having an impact on real world: «think what it would be 
to have a work conceived from outside the self, a work that would let us escape 
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the limited perspective of the individual ego, not only to enter into selves like 
our own but to give speech to that which has no language, to the bird […] to 
the tree […], to stone, to cement, to plastic» (Calvino, 1988: ch. V). 
 
3.2. The Multilayer Cognitive Value Typical of Literature 
So, a divide between two different kinds of knowledge is at stake: the knowledge 
readers derive by unfolding literary worlds can be related to a contingent level 
or to a non-contingent one as well as to both of them. The contingent level of 
knowledge is acquired by readers involuntarily: when reading Les Misérables, 
readers mechanically acquire knowledge concerning French history (French 
Revolution, Napoleonic Wars, Bourbon Restoration) and French society 
(lowest social classes of XVIII-XIX centuries). Contrariwise, the non-
contingent level of knowledge is acquired by readers insofar as they aim for this 
goal on purpose: when reading Les Misérables, readers can decide to reflect upon 
some topics and phenomena that this novel exemplifies and deals with. They 
could ponder over forgiveness, repentance and bravery: this means that they 
take the novel as a notable exemplification and as a significant springboard for 
a reflection upon these phenomena. This reflection consists in what Husserl 
named “eidetic variation” (i.e. freie Phantasie): starting from the literary 
exemplification, readers can opt to wonder what inherently characterizes those 
phenomena that the literary work at issue deals with. Doing so, they wonder 
whether the literary portrait (verbal image) provided by the author seems to 
them appropriate and useful for understanding the essential nature of the 
phenomena at issue: the priest forgives Jean Valjean, does forgiveness imply 
repentance of the forgiven person? Valjean undertakes a path of repentance: is 
repentance affected by forgiveness? If readers reflect upon phenomena 
exemplified by literary works, they mentally vary these phenomena: they regard 
literary works as starting points for examining phenomena and trying to identify 
their distinguishing features by mentally varying them. Thus, they acquire a 
specific kind of knowledge that is related to a non-contingent level since it is 
independent of contexts. My knowledge of what repentance is does not change 
along with contexts: surely, it can be affected and so revised, but it does not 
depend on contexts as my knowledge of French Revolution depends on the 
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historical context of the XVIII century. Husserl’s stance turns out to be 
indispensable to the comprehension of this non-contingent level of knowledge 
literature provides readers with. According to Husserl, eidetic variation is a 
“legitimized source of knowledge” («Rechtsquelle der Erkenntnis», 1913: §23, 
§24): readers can acquire knowledge from literature thanks to free phantasy, i.e. 
the ability that enables them to carry out eidetic variation.  
Hence, we are arguing that literature’s cognitive value is inherently double: 
firstly, it regards a contingent level of knowledge; secondly, it regards a non-
contingent level of knowledge. The first one occurs involuntarily, whereas the 
second one occurs insofar as readers strive to reflect upon phenomena 
exemplified by literary worlds. Consequently, readers play an active and pivotal 
role during reading. In fact, if readers intend to acquire a kind of knowledge 
that is not confined to contexts, then they have to examine the phenomena 
exemplified: they do it through “eidetic variation” and thanks to freie Phantasie 
(Husserl, 1987).  
Let us consider another example. Reading Die Ungeduld des Herzens by 
Zweig, readers could wonder what compassion and pity are, what distinguishes 
them from love and how responsibility is linked with these feelings. In so doing, 
they mentally vary these phenomena in their features so as to pinpoint those 
traits that characterize them inherently, those traits without which the 
phenomena at issue would not be the same phenomena. For instance, when 
reflecting upon repentance, one could wonder whether relief characterizes it 
inherently — and so in every context by necessity — or by chance — and so 
only in a few contexts. This means that readers wonder what repentance 
without relief could be and, thanks to this variation, try to reflect upon 
repentance’s essence. Freie Phantasie enables readers to vary phenomena in their 
traits in order to identify those features that characterise them essentially: this 
kind of reflection leads them to a non-contingent level of knowledge.  
 
3.3. The Bedrock of Literature’s Cognitive Value 
Once we have understood that literary worlds are endowed with cognitive 
value, questions and doubts concerning the bedrock of this cognitive value 
arise: what enables literary works to be sources of knowledge?  
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When reading literary works, we gain knowledge of other worlds: we 
immerse ourselves in Silas Marner’s world, in Rodion Romanovič Raskol’nikov’s 
world, in Eugénie Grandet’s world, and so forth. Authors disclose worlds that 
readers can access. The means that enables authors to disclose worlds and the 
means that enables readers to access them is the same: words. Hence, literary 
worlds are first of all verbal worlds. Literary works represent verbal worlds: this 
feature distinguishes literature from other sorts of representation. Walton’s 
stance on this matter turns out to be significant. According to him, literary 
works are “props” that generate “fictional truths” (Walton, 1990: part I) and 
literature’s specific way of representation is verbal (Walton, 1990: part IX). 
“Props” are «real world objects or states of affairs that make propositions true 
in the make-believe world, i.e. “fictional”» (2013: 1). Literary works act as props 
that generate fictional truths, which are propositions that are true only in the 
fictional world they are related to. Props make these propositions true and 
fictional: thus, props generate fictional truths. So, literary worlds represent 
verbal worlds that consist of fictional truths generated by literary works acting 
as props. This issue is a necessary step in order to comprehend how it is possible 
that literary works are sources of knowledge. So, it is possible to acquire 
knowledge from literary works since they give rise to fictional worlds and, 
consequently, to fictional truths related to these worlds. We can acquire 
knowledge from literature since literary works’ nature consists in generating 
truths. Following Walton, these truths are first of all fictional: they are related 
to a given literary work’s fictional world.  
Now, if we stretch this first degree of knowledge (related to fictional 
truths), we can unveil a second degree of knowledge (which is contingent) and 
eventually a third one (which is non-contingent). These three levels of 
knowledge are overlapping and cannot be loosely clustered or lucidly split up. 
Literature has a cognitive value since it is a source of knowledge. The knowledge 
readers can acquire from reading literary works is step-by-step: its contents 
gradually change as well as the role of readers becomes from passive to active. 
At the first step, readers acquire knowledge of truths that apply to the literary 
world at issue: reading Pride and Prejudice, they come to know that Elizabeth and 
Darcy finally get married. At the second step, readers acquire knowledge of 
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truths that apply to the literary world at issue and to the real world: reading I 
Promessi Sposi, they come to know that in 1630 Milan was caught by an outbreak 
of plague. At the third step, readers acquire knowledge of truths that apply to 
the literary world at issue, to the real world and to every possible world: reading 
Die Verwandlung, they come to know what alienation is. 
 
4. Towards Appropriate Literary Experiences 
Literary works represent literary worlds that are to be regarded as verbal images. 
Regardless of any possible visual involvement, literary experiences entail 
phantasy as free variation and imagination as making believe. Authors provide 
readers with coordinates, and, mutually, readers lean on such coordinates to 
unfold literary worlds and build them up. In this respect, a significant question 
arises: do all of these worlds taking shape through readers’ imagination mirror 
and exemplify an appropriate literary experience? While reading literary works, 
should readers comply with a sort of standard of appropriateness? Does an 
appropriate way of unfolding literary worlds exist? Subsequently, do appropriate 
literary experiences exist?  
The current section tries to answer these questions and to find out the link 
that ties philosophy of literature to aesthetics. In order to achieve this goal, a 
phenomenological principle devised by Moritz Geiger will turn out to be helpful 
for identifying a standard of aesthetic appropriateness that could be related to 
the scope of literary experiences. Such a link between philosophy of literature 
and phenomenology highlights that phenomenology itself could be a valuable 
way of approaching literary experiences and literary worlds. For this reason, the 
possibility of a phenomenology of literature will then be taken into account too. 
So, this section poses the question as to whether a standard of 
appropriateness related to the experience of literary worlds exists. We are 
wondering whether there is a standard or a parameter readers should comply 
with and follow in order to experience literary worlds in an appropriate way. The 
more radical issue that underlies this question concerns the meaning of the term 
“appropriate”: we are wondering whether literary experiences could be more or 
less adequate with relation to those literary worlds they are related to. This means 
that there could be more or less appropriate ways of unfolding literary worlds. 
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Moritz Geiger’s stance plays a pivotal role in such a reflection. He identifies a 
parameter of appropriateness that enables us to understand which experiences 
are to be deemed as aesthetic experiences, to comprehend how to have 
ourselves such experiences and to identify those features that make aesthetic 
experiences more or less adequate and appropriate. This parameter of 
appropriateness is Geiger’s “das Grundprinzip ästhetischen Erlebens”, devised 
by him in Vom Dilettantismus im künstlerischen Erleben:  
nurjenes Erleben ist ästhetisch, das den Werten des Kunstwerkes oder des ästhetischen 
Gegenstandes seinen Ursprung verdankt […] nur die Außenkonzentration [ist] die 
spezifisch ästhetische Haltung; nur in ihr wird das Kunstwerk in seinen Werten, in 
seinen wesentlichen Struktureigentümlichkeiten erfaßt. [...] Nur in 
Außenkonzentration gibt es überhaupt Sinn, von einem adäquaten ästhetischen 
Erleben zu reden, einem Erleben, das den Werten des Kunstwerkes gerecht wird. 
(Geiger, 1928: 5, 15, 17) 
External concentration — versus inner concentration — consists in 
steering the experiences entirely towards the intended object’s nature along with 
its values and traits: «in Außenkonzentration die Werte des Kunstwerkes in uns 
eindringen und Beglückungen schaffen, prinzipiell verschieden von allen 
banalen Rausch- und Erregungswirkungen» (Geiger, 1928: 17-18). For example, 
while staring in wonderment at a beautiful landscape, one chooses whether to 
focus the attention on the feelings arisen while enjoying the landscape (inner 
concentration) — that means on his/her innermost sides — or on landscape 
itself (external concentration) — that means on the external experienced object. 
In order to grasp the type of concentration at stake, it is enough identifying 
what we focus on while experiencing the intended object, no matter if it is a 
portrait or a landscape, a melody or a literary work. If we only focus on the 
effects [Wirkungen] that this object arouses — for example, feelings and 
emotions — then it is a matter of inner concentration. Contrarily, if we steer 
our attention primarily towards the values of the object itself (for example, the 
painting technique of a picture, as Geiger argues), then it is a matter of external 
concentration. Geiger highlights how sentimentality (“die Sentimentalitäẗt”8) is 
the most typical example of inner concentration. And if we let inner 
concentration prevails, what seems to us significant is the set of feelings we 
                                                        
8 Geiger, 1928: 14. 
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experience rather than “der ästhetische Gegenstand”. Geiger draws two main 
conclusions. Firstly, inner concentration does not make us enjoy art: it merely 
rests upon enthusiasm [Begeisterung]. Secondly, inner concentration lays the 
foundation for an aesthetics of effects [Wirkungsästhetik] — instead of an 
aesthetics of values [Wertästhetik]9 — since it rests upon the effects [Wirkungen] 
that the experienced object arouses: «Solcher Wirkungsästhetik stellt sich die 
Wertästhetik entgegen. Für sie liegt das Zentrum des künstlerischen Prozesses 
nicht im Aufnehmenden, sondern im Kunstwerk selbst. Das Kunstwerk ist 
wertvoll in sich, es ist der Träger von Wertmomenten — von Werten der 
Proportion, der Wiedergabe der Natur usw. — ganz gleichgültig, ob jemand 
diese Werte aufnimmt oder nicht» (Geiger, 1928: 32). 
It is worth noticing that leaving aesthetics of effects on the sidelines does 
not imply that aesthetic experiences should not entail any kind of effect, any 
kind of reaction from the subject. This simply implies that we should not 
substitute effects [Wirkungen] for object’s values [Werte]. More specifically, 
Geiger distinguishes superficial effects from deep ones («Oberflächen- und 
Tiefenwirkung der Kunst»10). He distinguishes those effects that merely affect 
the surface of our living — like amusement or delight — from those that affect 
the innermost sides of our living — like the effects that can upset the observer 
who is before Rembrandt’s portraits. These effects should not and cannot be 
uprooted: they inherently contribute to the nature of aesthetic experiences. A 
detailed analysis of this divide lies outside the frame of this research’s interest. 
Nonetheless, the point is whether we overshadow or not object’s values to put 
these effects in the foreground.  
So, external concentration enables us to experience objects aesthetically 
by putting their values in the foreground: within this frame, there are no limits 
                                                        
9 According to the aesthetics of values, the unit of measurement of aesthetic experiences is the whole 
of values that marks off the experienced object. Consequently, the aesthetics of values poses the 
question as to how our experiences could be more or less adequate to the object itself: «von 
Adäquatheit des Erlebens läßt sich nur vom Standpunkt der Wertästhetik aus sinnvoll reden, denn 
hier ist der Wert des Kunstwerks der Maßstab, und das Erleben hat diesem Wert adäquat zu werden, 
sich ihm anzupassen»9, and again «nur In Außenkonzentration gibt es überhaupt Sinn, von einem 
adäquaten ästhetischen Erleben zureden, einem Er- leben, das den Werten des Kunstwerkes gerecht 
wird» (Geiger, 1928: 33). 
10 Geiger, 1928: 43-66. 
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to our potential aesthetic experiences. Aesthetics experiences could arise while 
feeling an emotion, gazing at a person, reading a literary work, working with 
others, talking to a person, etc. The key to the aesthetic degree of such 
experiences is our endeavour to mainly focus on the object’s values and the key 
to aesthetic appropriateness is our endeavour to mainly lean on external 
concentration. Hence, we could surmise that it is all about attunement: in order 
to carry out aesthetic experiences, we are supposed to carry out an attunement to 
the object rather than to ourselves. This feature could be named aesthetic attunement. 
And aesthetic appropriateness proceeds straight from it. 
So, Geiger’s fundamental principle of aesthetic experience is useful for 
identifying a standard of literary appropriateness. What raises valuable interest 
about Geiger’s stance is that he deals with ästhetische Haltung, that is, aesthetic 
approach, aesthetic attitude: trying to relate “das Grundprinzip ästhetischen 
Erlebens” to literary experiences means trying to give rise to appropriate literary 
experiences. The appeal to external concentration enables readers to unfold 
literary worlds in an appropriate way. 
 
4.1. Phenomenology of literature 
Phenomenology turned out to be useful for identifying the standard of aesthetic 
appropriateness towards literary worlds. This remark is the key to argue that a 
study area concerning phenomenology and literature could be meaningful (cf. 
Ciocan, 2008). If phenomenology were related to literary scope, then it seems 
it is possible to achieve theoretical, attitudinal and practical results that will be now 
briefly explained: phenomenology of literature is a valuable study area and it 
fosters noteworthy studies. 
Theoretical results concern the identification of literary works’ essential 
traits: as the previous section discussed, every literary work represents a literary 
world as coordinate system, Umwelt, Welt and verbal image. It is worth noticing 
that phenomenology of literature does not imply an effort of defining literature. 
Following Guillen (1985), the attempt to define literature implies literature’s 
death. Surely, Guillen is right. In fact, phenomenology of literature does not 
aim at defining literature. It aims at identifying “constraints of variance” of 
literary works: which features make a text a literary work? Which features 
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essentially characterize literary works and so literary worlds? Trying to answer 
these questions does not entail an effort of defining literature. Indeed, it entails 
the effort of identifying the essential traits literature consists of: the difference 
between these two perspectives is subtle, but deep. This research is deeply 
examining the topic of literary experience and, in so doing, it is gradually 
recognizing the essential traits literary works and corresponding literary worlds 
consist of. 
Attitudinal results concern the identification of a general way of 
experiencing literary works appropriately: as Geiger suggests, this way coincides 
with Außenkonzentration. Additionally, phenomenology provides us with another 
meaningful remark regarding attitudinal suitability. In fact, there is another 
phenomenological element that is essentially related to an appropriate literary 
attitude, i.e. phenomenological “epochè”. According to Husserl, “epochè” is 
necessary in order to grasp the essential traits of every phenomenon. 
Consequently, phenomenological “epochè” is necessary to re-unfold literary 
worlds in an appropriate way. Husserl employs the term “einklammern” to 
explain what “epochè” consists in (1913: §32). “Einklammern” means “to, 
temporarily, put into brackets” what we already know about a phenomenon 
without deriving it directly from the phenomenon itself. For example, readers 
of Pride and Prejudice could know something about this work thanks to its related 
movie or a literary textbook. All these data distort and warp readers’ experiences 
since they concern the phenomenon (that is, the literary work) without being 
directly derived from an experience of it (that is, from reading it). This simply 
means that such data should be temporarily put into brackets and then, after 
reading the literary work at issue, taken into account. In literary scope, the 
application of “epochè” enables readers to have a direct approach towards 
literary works they are reading. Thanks to phenomenological “epochè” we can 
discover “new sides of things”. Let us imagine to approach a famous picture by 
putting into brackets all we know about this picture without deriving it from 
experiencing the picture itself (for example, information derived from art 
handbooks): thanks to “epochè”, we will be able to discover “new sides of the 
picture” (see new details, pinpointing new aspects, and so on).  
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Practical results concern the identification of literature’s trait of “reality 
without existence”: such a striking feature enables readers to understand that 
literature can really hold sway over the so-called “real world”. This implies that 
literary works can truly contribute to a transformation of real world: if readers 
comprehend this potential value of literature, then they will concretely 
demonstrate that literary worlds can become existing thanks to readers’ effort 
of relating them to “real world”. Reading literary works make readers be aware 
that the so-called “real world” can be actually modified. Next and last section 
aims at clarifying and explaining this striking trait of literary worlds: reality 
without existence. 
 
5. Literary Worlds and Real World: Literary Reality and Literary Existence  
Literary experience consists in disclosing literary worlds. Imagination as making 
believe enables readers to unfold these worlds, phantasy as eidetic variation 
enables readers to acquire knowledge from them. Now, is literature’s bearing 
on real world confined to its cognitive value? That is to say, do literary worlds 
affect real world only to the extent that readers can derive knowledge from 
unfolding literary worlds? It does not seem so: by reading Pride and Prejudice, 
thanks to imagination we unfold Elizabeth’s and Darcy’s literary world, thanks 
to free phantasy we gain knowledge about pride’s and prejudice’s essence. Now, 
a third element seems to be missing. In fact, it seems that literary influence over 
real world broadly exceeds the levels of knowledge we can acquire from literary 
worlds. Specifically, it seems that literary worlds affect readers’ way of inhabiting 
real world, regardless of the knowledge readers can derive by unfolding them. 
Hence, this section aims at combing trough and reflecting upon such a striking 
impression: beyond heuristic and cognitive value, literary worlds seem to be 
endowed with a deeper and radical value that directly affects real world and 
readers’ way of inhabiting it. 
If literary worlds can actually affect readers’ position in real world, then 
they should be endowed with a trademark that makes this influence possible. 
This trademark seems to be their “reality without existence”: literary worlds are 
per se real and potentially existing. This means that literary works display worlds 
that, regardless of every possible act of reading, are real; nevertheless, they can 
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become existing only through reader’s efforts. What does literary worlds’ reality 
consist in? What does literary worlds’ existence consist in? How are they linked 
together? This section argues for a thesis concerning literary reality - existence 
and tries to answer these questions accordingly. 
Now, if we focus on literary worlds’ nature, then we can describe literary 
worlds as real worlds: while unfolding literary worlds, readers feel like they are 
facing something strongly real, although it does not exist. It is a reality that 
fascinates without subjugating as reality itself does (Ingarden, 1972: §63; cf. 
Voltolini, 2010: 142-143). It is not a matter of quantitative differences, that is 
to say, of acknowledging that literary worlds are less real then real world. It’s a 
matter of qualitative differences: literary worlds are somehow real, but this 
reality seems to be different from real world’s reality. “Real” seems to be a 
quality typical of what readers turn their attention to while reading, i.e. literary 
worlds. Which traits does literary reality rely on? It seems it rests on three 
features: human perspective’s role, verbal independence of readers and literary 
worlds’ link with real word. These traits will be now examined, but it is worth 
noticing that the third one explains what literary works’ existence consists in 
and, in so doing, the link between literary worlds’ existence and literary worlds’ 
reality comes to light. 
Firstly, no matter how literary worlds could be or seem far from real world, 
they inevitably mirror a human perspective: they arise from a human 
perspective, the author’s one. It is not possible for humans to adopt a non-
human perspective towards the so-called “real world”. This feature pick up on 
by Pavel (2006) and Calvino (1998) makes literary worlds real, although they do 
not exist: this means that these worlds do not exist in Lebenswelt11, but they are 
real since each of them is Lebenswelt too and by necessity. While reading a literary 
work, we do not expect to encounter their characters or their described 
circumstances in real world: surely, literary characters, along with their feelings, 
emotions, descriptions, events, circumstances, situations, do not exist in 
Lebenswelt, but, at the same time, characters’, feelings’, emotions’, descriptions’, 
events’, circumstances’, situations’ world is Lebenswelt too: this is literary worlds’ 
                                                        
11 The term “Lebenswelt” is used following Husserl’s standpoint (Husserl, 1913: §27). 
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reality. The world we live in is Lebenswelt: similarly, literary worlds are themselves 
instances of Lebenswelt. 
Secondly, reality of literary worlds is closely related to their verbal 
independence. Literary worlds’ verbal independence relies on the non-identity 
between visual and verbal images: authors’ visual images and readers’ verbal 
images do not coincide. This entails that readers device verbal images that are 
different from those of authors and other readers. Once a literary work is 
written, it exists as an independent verbal entity, i.e. as a set of words that 
represents a literary world: it consists of those words the author chose in order 
to translate her visual image into words. Regardless of any possible act of 
reading, it seems that this set of words represents a literary world anyway: if this 
world were unfolded by readers, then verbal images would arise, but the literary 
world at issue seems to be endowed with a verbal independence of readers. 
Consequently, the verbal independence’s issue is not confined to the non-
identity between visual and verbal images: literary works’ verbal independence 
also relies on literary worlds’ independence of every subjective act.  
Such a verbal independence characterises literary works and the worlds 
they represent, although in every literary work there are “undetermined points” 
that can be filled only by subjective acts. The existence of these “undetermined 
points” has been clearly highlighted by Roman Ingarden (1972). According to 
him, in every literary work there are “undetermined points” — he named them 
“Unbestimmtheitsstellen” — that need to be filled by subjective acts: firstly by 
the author, secondly by readers (Ingarden, 1972: §38). For example, if the 
author describes a person as an old and skilled man, then the author herself and 
every hypothetical reader will have to fill some undetermined points, that is to 
say, will have to think of this man as a person with two arms, two legs, one 
head, and so on. This completion is as inevitable as unaware: if we do not 
recognize it, we would not faithfully describe the experience of reading literary 
works. However, this unquestionable issue is not the reason why this paragraph 
deals with undetermined points: in fact, literary worlds’ verbal independence is 
at stake. According to Ingarden, the existence of “undetermined points” leads 
us to claim that literary works are per se incomplete and so, if they were not 
filled by subjective acts, then they would be like an incomplete skeleton 
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(Bertoni, 2010: 81), like a human body lacking flesh. Ingarden’s thesis seems to 
be weak: surely, the existence of “undetermined points” is undeniable, 
removable only through subjective acts and necessary (if the author specified 
each of these points, her act of writing would be endless as well as the literary 
work would be unreadable). However, once a literary world is unfolded by the 
author through her writing, then all the “undetermined points” of this literary 
work are already filled by the author: from authors’ viewpoint, their own literary 
worlds are devoid of “undetermined points”. So, even before every possible act 
of reading, literary work’s “Unbestimmtheitsstellen” are already filled by the 
author. When someone reads this literary work, then its 
“Unbestimmtheitsstellen” will be filled also by the reader at issue. So, it seems 
that the existence of undetermined points is not enough to argue for literary 
works’ dependence on subjective acts: if there were a literary work anyone has 
not read yet, then it would carry on being a literary work and representing a 
literary world: it would not be an incomplete skeleton. Surely, a huge difference 
lasts between literary works never read and literary works that are or were read. 
The point is that no literary work could loose its status of “literary work” since 
the world it unfolds is independent of every possible act of reading. Surely, 
literary worlds call for readers’ re-unfolding, but readers give rise to verbal 
images different from authors’ visual images and, furthermore, in order for a 
literary work to represent a literary world, authors’ act of unfolding the literary 
world at issue is enough. 
Thirdly, literary reality relies on the impact literary worlds can have on real 
world. Literary worlds enable readers to conceive real world as a changeable 
and variable world: literature affects reality insofar as literary worlds make 
readers aware of this changeability. Thus, literary works can actually contribute 
to a transformation of real world, but only if readers aim for this. If they 
understand this potential value of literature, then their actions will concretely 
demonstrate that literary worlds can become existing thanks to readers’ efforts 
of relating them to reality. Literary worlds become existing insofar as they bear 
on readers’ way of inhabiting real world: readers are able to relate literary worlds 
— already real — to the world they inhabit and such a nexus transforms these 
literary worlds into existing worlds. Literary existence rests on literary worlds’ 
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possible influence over real world: such an influence takes place if and only if 
readers relate literary worlds to real world. It seems that readers can relate 
literary worlds to real world in two and interwoven ways: on the one hand, they 
can reflect upon literary worlds and so reach different levels of knowledge — 
as the section concerning phantasy has already pointed out — on the other 
hand, they can let their own ways of inhabiting real world be influenced by 
literary worlds and, in so doing, they become aware that real world can be 
actually changed and modified. This second way needs to be better explained. 
Every literary work can affect and influence readers’ position in real world 
since every literary world represents a different — but human — perspective 
towards real world. Literary worlds are not self-referential, they always display 
new ways of inhabiting real world and so reading a literary work can influence our 
own way of inhabiting real world and acting in it. This newness we discover 
every time we read a literary work points out a remarkable issue: every literary 
work shows and displays a different perspective towards real world. 
Nonetheless, this perspective is human by necessity and so it shows how the 
world we live in is deeply changeable: literary worlds enable readers to consider 
real world from perspectives different from every readers’ own perspective. 
This multiplicity of perspectives — which are, at the same time, different from 
one another but human by necessity — discloses newness and so allows readers 
to discover new ways of inhabiting real world. The awareness that there are 
different ways of inhabiting real world, different ways of acting in it, different 
ways of facing life, etc., leads readers to realize that real world is inherently 
changeable: the awareness of an endless multiplicity of different, but human, 
perspectives towards real world helps us to realize real world’s changeability. 
As long as literary worlds cannot avoid mirroring a human perspective, readers 
can be deeply influenced by them: literary works represent literary worlds as 
verbal images, that is to say, coordinate systems that ensue from a human 
perspective by necessity. As Calvino pointed out, this last feature is an 
impassable frontier:  
Think what it would be to have a work conceived from outside the self, a work that 
would let us escape the limited perspective of the individual ego, not only to enter into 
selves like our own but to give speech to that which has no language, to the bird 
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perching on the edge of the gutter, to the three in spring and the three in fall, to stone, 
to cement, to plastic… (Calvino, 1988: 124). 
This inevitability is the sole literary feature that enables readers to become 
aware of new ways of inhabiting real world. This means that literature’s bearing on 
real world broadly rests on knowledge readers can acquire from them and, at the 
same time, exceeds it. It is a matter of letting one’s own way of inhabiting real 
world be influenced by literary works and corresponding literary worlds. 
Influence’s ways are endless, but each of them relies on imagination’s heuristic 
value and phantasy’s cognitive value: imagination enables readers to disclose 
new dimensions of reality as well as phantasy enables readers to acquire from 
literary worlds a kind of knowledge that is related to real world too. This means 
that novels, poems, tales and other literary genre12 are means by which readers 
discover newness: the link between literary worlds and real world always reveals 
something new. Kids usually lose their enthusiasm for things when the sense of 
newness wears off: literary worlds cannot bore readers indeed. Writer’s style or 
plot can bore readers, but literary worlds themselves always unveil something 
new about real world and especially new ways of inhabiting real world: new ways of 
turning to reality, of comprehending feelings’ and emotions’ nature, of figuring 
problems out, of facing events, of understanding others’ behaviour, of 
reflecting upon a topic that is exemplified in the text, and so forth. All these 
different ways are disclosed by imagination’s heuristic value that enables us to 
discover new dimensions of reality and to act accordingly. Thanks to phantasy 
these new dimensions of reality are then related to real world: a link between 
literary worlds and real world takes shape and is nourished by readers.  
Literary worlds’ reality without existence has led us to grasp the nexus between 
literary works and readers’ position in real world. Literary worlds can influence 
readers’ way of inhabiting real world: this means that there is a deep linkage 
between text and readers’ acting. Hence, Ricoeur’s analysis in Du texte a l’action 
turns out to be very interesting since he links together these two items. 
Specifically, he maintains that text is a «bon paradigme» for human action and 
                                                        
12 «The abandonment of distinctions of species in the face of demands for universally desired qualities 
is one of the most interesting events in modern literary history […] Objectivity, subjectivity, sincerity, 
insincerity, inspiration, imagination – these can be looked for and praised or blamed whether an 
author is writing comedy, tragedy, epic, satire or lyric» (Booth, 1983: 35, 36). 
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action is a «bon référent» for texts (Ricoeur, 1986: 175): his argument is relevant 
to the current thesis since he provides us with more means of understanding 
the link between literary worlds and real world. Firstly, he claims that «agir 
signifie avant tout opérer un changement dans le monde» (1986: 172). Secondly, 
he claims that actions are quasi-texts. In fact, just like texts, actions gradually 
become something else from their author until they end up being entirely set 
apart: «[l’action humaine] est extériorisée d’une manière comparable à la fixation 
caractéristique de l’écriture» (Ricoeur, 1986: 175). Furthermore, actions and 
texts leave observable traces that become independent of their authors and so 
actions and texts themselves become autonomous. Ultimately, actions’ and 
texts’ influence is not confined to the original context where they were 
originated: «l’action, comme un texte, est une œuvre ouverte, addressee à une 
suite indefinite de “lecteurs” possibles» (Ricoeur, 1986: 175). 
Literary worlds are per se real and potentially existing: when reading literary 
works, we re-unfold worlds that were originally unfolded by authors. Literary 
worlds are strongly real, potentially existing and possible to be imagined: they 
demand to be turned to appropriately, provide readers with coordinates that 
enable them to imagine and are closely related to real world since they refer to 
and represent Lebenswelt by necessity. We have now all the means by which we 
can realize that literature can really affect real world: the link between literary 
worlds and real world needs readers to be carried out. If this link were not 
carried out, literary worlds would carry on being real, without being existing. 
Imagination enables us to unfold literary worlds and so to discover literary 
reality, whereas phantasy enables us to relate literary worlds to real world and 
so to transform this reality into existence. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
The distinction between literary reality and literary existence is the key to 
comprehension of this research’s subtitle: Imagination’s Bearing on Literary Reality 
and Phantasy’s Bearing on Literary Existence. By appeal to imagination as making 
believe we can explore literary worlds — i.e. re-unfolding them — whereas by 
appeal to phantasy as freie Phantasie we can reflect upon literary worlds, acquire 
knowledge from them and so tether literary worlds to the world we inhabit: this 
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nexus transforms literary reality into literary existence. Literary worlds’ reality is 
related to their verbal independence, to their potential influence over readers’ 
position in real world and to their unavoidable link with a human perspective. 
Literary worlds are real independently of readers, whereas they can become 
existing thanks to readers who relate them to real world: literary worlds disclose 
new ways of inhabiting real word and such a newness can have a great impact 
on readers’ position in real world. Literary worlds are per se real and potentially 
existing: this thesis was the peak of a research that aimed at describing literary 
experience and, so, literary worlds. Such a purpose turned out to be so knotty 
and awkward that only an extended analysis managed to unscramble and 
disentangle it.  
This research’s core as well as its starting point was literary experience 
itself. While reading literary works, we imagine literary worlds and, possibly, we 
spontaneously give rise to visual sketches related to these worlds, which literary 
works represent. Our ordinary and common literary experiences are inherently 
related to experiencing literary worlds. A reflection upon literary worlds’ nature 
enabled us to understand the roles that visualization, phantasy and imagination 
play in literary experiences. Literature’s cognitive and heuristic values came so 
to light as well as the dynamic between visual and verbal images: authors 
translate their visual images into words and every reader that reads these words 
will deceive different verbal images. Every discussed thesis and every theoretical 
proposal turned to a thick nexus and a reciprocal influence between literary 
worlds and real world: literary worlds are per se real and potentially existing. 
Literary worlds deeply affect our lives in the real world: we acquire knowledge 
from them, we discover new worlds through them, we feel emotions while 
unfolding them, we are affected by them. The more we try to unfold them in 
an appropriate way, the more we explore them deeply and, in so doing, strengthen 
the link between them and the world we are suck into. We can transform literary 
worlds into existing worlds if and only if we primarily grasp their reality: firstly, 
imagination enables us to disclose and unfold literary worlds; secondly, 
phantasy enables us to acquire knowledge from them; thirdly, we lean on both 
imagination’s and phantasy’s values in order to relate literary worlds to real 
world. Literary worlds are amazing real worlds that readers can transform into 
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